Social enterprise is actually not a new practice, but instead a ‘new language’ that reinvigorated old organizational forms in the late 1980s as a way to tackle social exclusion through market strategies (Defourny & Nyssens 2010). Social enterprises are evaluated in positive terms (Hervieux et al. 2010). They empower communities by putting them in control of asset management and solutions to their problems (Gunn & Durkin 2010) and mobilising and strengthening social reciprocity or ‘social capital’ (Kay 2006). The process of social entrepreneurship, which is involved in the implementing of social enterprises and their subsequent successes (Haugh 2005), also makes social enterprises agile or innovative.\(^1\) They fill gaps in the provision of social goods and services left by the public or private sector (Galera & Borzaga 2009), essentially compensating for ‘government and market failures’ (Koch 2010).

Social enterprises are also viewed as ‘wealth creation engines’ in their own right, evidenced by the generation of substantial revenues, employment and the societal conditions needed for stronger markets (Harding 2004; Dees 2008). In the Developing World context the United Nations Global Compact applies this logic by promoting social enterprise development as a way to generate conducive socio-economic conditions for business at the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ (BoP), the win-win scenario in which corporations can more easily enter markets and boost the economy (Power et al. 2012). Whilst many now see social enterprises offering ‘hope’ for sustainable development (Seelos & Mair 2009), this chapter adopts a more critical perspective by suggesting that understandings of this in the Developing World are hampered due to their distinct focus on western epistemologies. At stake here is the recognition that interest in social enterprises first emerged in response to western welfare problems and can be considered as a western-centric welfare discourse (Hackett 2009).

Purporting that particular manifestations of social enterprises are conditioned, at least in part, by the cultural context in which they are enacted (Peredo & McLean 2006), the chapter seeks to unveil the ethnocentrism inherent in dominant renditions of social enterprise by
zooming in on a United Nations project geared toward promoting entrepreneurial activity in and, ultimately, the livelihood of indigenous Cambodian forested communities. Fundamentally, this research explores the everydayness of social enterprises in two adjacent villages, in Rovieng District which lies to the south of Preah Vihear Province in northern Cambodia. The central research question guiding this research is: How do social enterprises emerge, survive and/or succeed in Preah Vihear? In addressing this question, the investigation unveils the narrowness of western understandings of social enterprise by raising sensitivity for the cultural contingency of social entrepreneurial projects and practices.

The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: An outline of the United Nations project in question is followed by a discussion of the situated context of the study, relating to indigenous minorities in Preah Vihear. The data collection and writing process is followed by analysis of findings that contrast institutional logics with local ones and then look critically at conceptual matters related to social enterprises including social capital, community participation and surplus distribution. Contextual constraints on innovation are also identified before a concluding discussion about the meaning of social enterprise from a village point of view. The chapter seeks to make a critical contribution to debates about social enterprise by showing how value free, managerialist approaches which are identifiable in the western discourses (Curtis 2008; Dey & Steyaert 2010) once again conflict with specificity of Developing World context. In this case, the chapter calls for a wider reading of the customary transactions within diverse economies to make sense of incentives for social enterprise development.

The United Nations ‘Creative Industries Support Program’ (CISP) in Cambodia
This Creative Industries Support Program (CISP) in Cambodia ran from 2008 – 2012, funded with $3.3m USD from the Spanish Government. It was implemented by four different United Nations agencies with participation from four Ministries of the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC). Program documents express that CISP was aimed at enhancing ‘cultural entrepreneurship’ but on close inspection much of this is oriented towards social enterprise development. Somewhat commensurately with social enterprise, CISP objectives included mobilising ‘social capital’ and the participation of indigenous communities as a way to ensure the equitable development of creative industries (MDG-F 2008, 8-14). Most specifically CISP was focused on the development of niche products as a way to instil resilience into indigenous minorities’ cultures whose way of life is being increasingly impacted by the market economy (ibid., 29-30). The specific case in which I take interest is a value chain program for Oleoresin
which is tapped (by ‘resin producers’) from dipterocarp trees. Oleoresin has a domestic and international market for boat caulking and boat sealant and an international market paint/varnish and perfumery/cosmetics (Andaya-Milani 2011). In accordance with CISP objectives, Oleoresin was a focus in Preah Vihear Province of attention because it is a traditional product of the Kuy indigenous minority peoples.

The situated context: Kuy minorities in Rovieng District, Preah Vihear
Kuy indigenous peoples mainly reside in the rural north of Cambodia (as well as parts of Laos and Thailand). They traditionally mix rice farming with livelihoods derived from the forest. Spiritual beliefs are Animist mixed with Buddhism. More importance is traditionally attached to local spirits (Ah’ret in Kuy language) than among the wider Khmer Buddhist population and much importance is attached to places of spiritual significance – particularly burial forests – where spirits are known to reside (Keating 2012; Swift 2013).

The Kuy in Preah Vihear live with a legacy of turmoil. Inevitably they suffered with the rest of the Cambodia after the Maoist Khmer Rouge overran the country, forcing most of the population into collective labour in rice collectives, rubber plantations or irrigation works and around 20% of the national population died in four years (1975-79) from starvation, disease and execution (Henderson 2007). In Rovieng, Kuy minorities were mistrusted by Khmer Rouge cadre and treated harshly (Swift 2013). The ousting of the Khmer Rouge from power in 1979 by the Vietnamese backed ‘Kampuchea People’s Republic’ did nothing to improve their fortunes. Rather Preah Vihear became a resistance stronghold and site for continual insurgency by the Khmer Rouge aligned with Royalist and Nationalist factions during 18 year subsequent years of civil war (Bekaert 1993; Sorenson 1993).

Despite relative peace since the demobilisation of the Khmer Rouge in the late 1990s, Kuy minorities continue to be impacted by events beyond their control. Land grabbing (the expropriation of land, often violently, under circumstances of legal ambiguity) along with RGC issued concessions for industrial agriculture, forestry and mining (which frequently amount to land grabbing) and deforestation has increasingly excluded Kuy minorities from access to natural resources and sites of spiritual significance (Keating 2012). Conflicts have proliferated (CCHR 2014) and companies have obtained security “on loan” from RGC Armed Forces who have killed several and beaten many Kuy people accessing concession areas (Keating 2013, 313-14). Saying the way of life of Kuy minorities is ‘impacted by the market economy’ thus seems restrained. Most pertinently to the text ahead, on account of producers exclusion from
resources the quantity of Oleoresin that producers can tap has reportedly produced halved from 20 to 40 average litres per day in just four years between 2005 and 2009 (ILO 2010, 19).

**Data collection and analysis**
Data collection between January and April 2011 began with three interviews: the UN-CISP coordinator; the director of a consultancy company hired train to Resin Producer Associations (RPAs) on marketing and finally the director of a local Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) recruited to the CISP Oleoresin program. The objective at this point was to find out more about CISP and gain insight into their perception of the reasons for an Oleoresin intervention. 12 qualitative interviews were subsequently undertaken with members of two (RPAs) located in adjacent villages. From this point onwards they appear as RPA-1 and RPA-2. The main thing gained from a comparison of two RPAs as opposed to a study of just one is that each RPA emerged under different circumstances and there are different insights to be drawn. RPA-1 emerged autonomously and pre-existed the CISP intervention while RPA-2 was formed purely in response to the procured interventions of CISP, initially being encouraged by the NGO and then encouraged further to cooperate by the consultant company in trainings. In each instance six interviews (five members plus the respective RPA leader) took place. This was followed by a group discussion with four interviewees (two members of RPA-2, one member RPA-1 and also the leader of RPA-1). The FGD objective was to see how responses differ in a group context and also to see what issues emerge as matters of importance during a discussion between villagers which are not elucidated in a single person interview.

All interviewees were *Kuy* indigenous minority villagers. *Kuy* minorities generally speak Khmer language which Swift (2013) puts down to their assimilation into wider Khmer culture in response to discrimination. A *Kuy* assistant was recruited for my interviews but all interviews were conducted in Khmer language, allowing me to engage at an elementary conversational level while taking notes from the translations given. Interviews tended to last between 90 minutes and two hours. Interviews for RPA leaders were shorter. All interviews were recorded and stored as electronic files. Interview notes were typed up and critical moments were revisited in recordings to get an accurate translation from a native Khmer speaker. Responses to each question were entered into a spread sheet for the purpose of drawing out general trends. The analysis was synthesised with literature on social enterprise alongside literature on Cambodia and *Kuy* minority experiences in order to develop a case study narrative.

This research was initially undertaken as part of a broader comparative study of three different types of social enterprises in Northern Cambodia (Lyne et al. 2013). This steered the
outcomes as far as western-centric debates and definitions surrounding social enterprise tended to take precedence. In part this was driven by the desire for outputs useful to the British Council who administrated the initiative Development in Higher Education Partnerships (DeLPHE) that was funding the research. On reflection more questions in the interview schedule derived from literature on Cambodian culture could give greater nuance to social enterprise from a grassroots village perspective.

Findings

Official and local logics of CISP

The analysis revealed a clear disjuncture between the various promoters of the resin project of CISP – e.g. coordinator, consultants, NGOs –, and how the two RPAs on the ground received the project. As to the former, the CISP coordinator asserted that protecting natural forestry resources and negotiating and managing access to NTFPs are critical issues for indigenous peoples because these resources have supported the livelihoods of Kay minority for generations. The organization of resin producers into coherent and responsible associations was paramount to this objective. The emphasis on social capital and community participation in CISP documents was readily apparent in his reasoning. The local NGO director also saw their remit as helping villagers to get organized to incentivise good forest management. The consultant concurred that community organising is important but from his perspective the most important activity was to resin marketing. In his view better marketing could enable villagers to leverage pressure for ensuring resin quality which in turn would build reputation in the locality and generate a better bargaining position with wholesalers. It was proposed that the RPAs could collaborate across villages on a ‘resin market’ to start dealing directly with wholesalers who would be brought into the area. He referred to this setup as a social enterprise. Among the three promoters of the CISP project he was the only one to frame the desired outcome of CISP using the specific terminology of social enterprise.

In contradiction to the official CISP logic, implied in the assumptions and sensitivities of the project document, in the two resin associations in Roveng there are differences in outlook. All but one of the RPA-1 members, unsurprisingly, said that their first priority as an RPA member is to improve their income. However there are critical differences between members of the two associations, in terms of how they sensed this would be achieved. In RPA-1 (which emerged organically, pre-dating the CISP intervention) most members joined to promote forestry protection. This was viewed as the best way to secure and perhaps improve their income. RPA-1 members recognised villagers’ participation in the destruction of their
own livelihoods. Mostly due to their increasing exclusion from natural resources, villagers have been compelled to seek more cash income by cutting trees to sell timber on the black market, sometimes taking up with illegal logging operations. It was expressed that the RPA-1 should promote better behaviour among villagers to ensure good relations with outside officials so that they are not banned from the forest. To this end RPA-1 has, with the encouragement of the local NGO, become part of a ‘Community Forestry organization’ which under 2002 Law on Forestry provides limited user rights on ‘state public land’ for subsistence purposes.

The RPA-2 membership (excluding a younger member) in contrast joined solely because they thought they could somehow sell more resin without much thought of conservation at all. This reflected on the origins of RPA-2 in response to the procured consultant services. While the leader had concerns with conservation, there was less agreement among other members about the necessity to change behaviour. There is also a profound lack of agreement about whether cutting trees is unethical given that powerful people outside of the village (including the military) do it on a much larger scale. Two members said that they were dissatisfied with the RPA-2 because they were not selling any more resin at all and that this justified cutting trees if they had no other way of making money. Two also complained about the teaching, expressing that more quality control in the group will just mean they cannot make money. It seems that the training was fraught with contradictions in the eyes of these respondents and the understanding of it unclear.

Community participation and social capital
The leader of the self-formed RPA-1 was elected. According to members he had good relations with forestry officials and was generally viewed by others as a ‘leading person’ who was trusted
to decisions. There is a view among members that ‘special people’ should not make decisions alone and that attending meetings was important. But it is also generally asserted that the leader should determine what decisions need to be made and call people to a meeting when he feels it is necessary to do so. One member said that everybody must be able to participate but sometimes it can be a burden, so it should be limited. In summary, because members were clear on their objectives, having formed the association among themselves without instigation from outside, there was a strong sense of ownership. Rather than being wholly participatory, RPA-1 in this instance lends support to ‘stewardship’ theories on social enterprise governance; i.e. participation in decisions is limited for better efficiency and leadership is exercised by the manager/entrepreneur who is also part of the community that the enterprise serves (Mason et al. 2007, 290-291) although inertia among members perhaps had much to do with the model they adopted.

The RPA-2 leader was not elected. He was chosen by lottery after the consultant training. He had also been in the village for only 10 months beforehand. It did not seem imperative among members that he had a standing in the village. Two RPA-2 members actually pointed to the Village Chief rather than the association leader when I asked who they thought the most important members were, even though the Village Chief is not an actual member of the RPA-2 at all. There was reportedly very low attendance at meetings. Three members expressed that participation in the RPA’s affairs was not necessary at all and that instead the leader should take care of matters on his own and communicate with the NGO and forestry officials. It was clear that RPA-2 was not living up to the CISP objective of promoting greater participation among communities in the management of their resources and affairs. In part this might have been the anticipated outcome of the RPA-2 having been directly constituted through a program focused upon resin marketing. When villagers failed to make more money their participation rapidly declined. The inertia of members was much higher than in RPA-1 and social capital, or bridging ties across different members of the community, was hard to envisage. Instead some members saw their chances for security hinging on relations with the Village Chief, although this was true in both villages in different ways. This underlines another contingency in the understanding of a how a social enterprise is likely to operate, which is the prevalence of patron-client relationships.

**Constraints on innovation: Patron client bonds**

The trainer sent by the consultant company expressed frustration that no members of either RPA were willing (in accordance with the consultant’s recommendations) to develop a resin
storage system with a view to bringing traders into the area. What transpired is that RPA members sell liquid resin directly to the Village Chief, who in turn deals with all outside wholesalers. Some come to his house where the resin is stored. Otherwise he has connections in Phnom Tbeng Meanchey, the main town in Preah Vihear Province. None of the members interviewed in either RPA, including leaders, would countenance any other system than selling their resin to the Village Chief who has the sole monopoly on the middleman position. All RPA members in different ways are deeply invested, as individuals, in patron-client relations with the Village Chief. More widely in Southeast Asian studies, patron-client relationships are a norm of reciprocity whereby villagers with limited options try to gain subsistence guarantees from personal (dyadic) relationships more powerful actors. There are implied obligations on the part of the patron, it is for instance anticipated that a legitimate patron will be ‘generous’ – regardless of whether or not their minimal obligations are met in practice (Scott 1977). This reality is widely observed in studies of Cambodian villages, where familial relations with patrons are deeply personal and carefully guarded (Ledgerwood 2007).

This anticipation of patron relations as insurance is deeply embedded among villagers whose livelihoods are precarious. Village Chiefs are not selected by vote, they are appointed directly by the Romoneiy Commune Chief. This is the case in all Cambodian villages; the Village Chief connects the village to Commune level politics which is overwhelmingly dominated by the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (although opposition parties are represented) (Hughes 2007). In the north of Cambodia powerful actors notoriously continue to extract rents from land titling as a privilege and in some instances elite actors are known to mobilise violence to press their claims upon resources (Diepart & Dupuis 2014). Under such circumstances, and no doubt in large part also due to past traumatic experiences set out earlier, maintaining a connection to a patron figure makes a lot of sense. The inequality of benefits from resin collection thus resonates with value chain studies elsewhere in Cambodia showing how the disproportionate sacrifice of surplus in return for ‘protection’ amounts to rational economic behaviour on the part of precarious villagers (Thavat 2010). This all brings into question the extent to which social enterprise can be considered as a market-based innovation that meets people’s social needs, as is generally asserted to be the case in literature. First of all this underlines how markets themselves are always contextual. With the supply crowd and demand crowd always come local norms and customs and also laws enforced by different means, as Polanyi (1957, 266-267) is well known for pointing out. Moreover, patrons have a tendency to thwart changes that are not in their own interest or to make sure that any changes serve their own interests or those of their most valuable supporters, as Matthews (2007)
illustrates in a study of village based financial institutions in Cambodia. The propensity for the types of ‘social innovations’ that social enterprises are in general deemed to be central to (Defourny & Nyssens 2013) must therefore be placed within some quite rigid limitations, in consideration of the way these RPAs work in practice.

This also calls into question some of the assumptions about who should stand to benefit from social enterprises. As a general rule western literature leans toward the notion that a social enterprise must be ‘not for profit’ (Defourny & Nyssens 2010) but in this instance it seems pertinent to ask what it is that surplus is being used for. As Scott (1977) illustrates, patron-client relationships in pre-capitalist society have traditionally provided the most basic type of social insurance available to peasantry. Arguably in this instance, with villagers caught between the customary economy typified by subsistence and trade in non-monetary goods, and the advancing capitalist one, insurance payments made by allowing the Village Chief to appropriate their surplus in value form is deemed to have social effects, or in the language of social enterprise, is deemed to be meeting important social needs. Beyond the questions about non-profit essentialism raised by patron-client relationships, it can also be asserted that the situated context (written earlier in this chapter) renders the non-profit orientation questionable more widely still. These are matters that I turn to next in consideration of debates about the distributions of surplus and equity within the social enterprise itself.

Social enterprise and community solidarity: Using surplus for social goals?

Both RPA leaders and two members of RPA-1 expressed that the use of monetary surpluses (from resin collection) for community development might be desirable. It was expressed as a good idea for instance if some money is invested into the construction of a well, concrete latrines and better timber for construction. RPA-1’s leader and one member also said a saving program might be one way to achieve this. However on the whole the notion of a social enterprise that reinvests its surpluses into social objectives instead of redistributing them to members (DTI 2002) is implausible. Those who said it is a good idea were less optimistic when I asked if it is actually a possibility. All other RPA members (notably the entirety of those in RPA-2) stressed that resin income is the property of members and their families alone. Money was needed for daily life. With less land accessible to farm and graze animals and declining access to forestry which provide salvaged wood fuel, different types of food and materials that could be traded, there are more things they must pay for nowadays with cash. Several villagers not only expressed that it was impractical to reinvest surplus income into village development, but also that they could not imagine this as the reason for an RPA at all. They felt it was the
Village Chief’s job to leverage resources through the Commune Council officials or that NGOs should provide such infrastructure.

If one clings to the view that social enterprises are a means by which communities gain control over their resources and solutions to their problems (Gunn & Durkin 2010), then the views of RPA members about the use of surplus become problematic. However it makes sense to look beyond the reinvestment of surplus to understand a social enterprise contextually in this instance. Uncertain futures make villagers lack of incentive to invest surplus in this way understandable. What they build today could be taken away tomorrow by the next land concession signed off by the RGC. This calls into question western-centric views of social enterprise because the notion that a community-based social enterprise could actually put a village community in ultimate control of its resources in northern Cambodia is dubious. This intersection of a customary economy and a capitalist one is always a problematic place for villagers to be because an increasing circulation of cash does not, per se, raise the quality of life (cf. James et al. 2012, 247-248) and in some conditions worsens it. However under these conditions of uncertainty, it seems reasonable enough that villagers deem the distribution of monetary income as a means for the day-to-day survival of a household as social in itself.

In addition to a lack of appetite for channelling monetary surplus beyond the household there is also little appetite in either RPA for any talk of equity vis-à-vis the disadvantaged. This constrains the type of solidarity viewed by some writers as the raison d’être for, and the identity politics of, social enterprise development (Hulgård et al. 2010). Every respondent said those who work hardest should get the most money. When I probed this they insisted it was regardless someone’s disability. This is despite that RPA membership included amputees and that Preah Vihear is one of five Provinces that collectively account for more than 60% of national landmine contamination (Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor 2016). Four respondents (three in RPA-1 which was otherwise the more social RPA) expressed that the badly disadvantaged, including the disabled, should go to an NGO – the RPA should bear no responsibility for them at all. An elderly respondent expressed in the strongest terms that “nobody owes anything to anybody else. If they are disabled, they need to be smarter. They have to think more how to get money.” Following the situated context written earlier, it is evident that past experiences and trauma, including forced collective labour during the Khmer Rouge time and conflicts until the late 1990s, put social solidarity in a particular context. This concurs essentially with others who also find that damaged trust and undermined relationships beyond the household are, in different ways, an enduring legacy of the Khmer Rouge time and subsequent conflicts (Zucker 2011).
Concluding discussion: A different way of seeing social enterprise?

At the outset of this chapter, I asked the question: How do social enterprises emerge, survive and/or succeed in Preah Vihear? The short answer would seem to be: autonomously and organically with their own self-determined objectives. The obvious lesson is that the assumption that social enterprise development in one village could mobilize the type of social capital found in another village has proven flawed. CISP documents recognise that each group engaged needs to find its own way to mobilize community participation because one size cannot fit all, but there is still an overriding emphasis on the development of models that can be widely replicated (MDG:F 2011, 14). This emphasis is similar to that placed on replicable models in social enterprise consultancy literature (Alter 2007, 49). But the problem more precisely here is that it is the value-free managerialist approach (Dey & Steyaert 2010) that seems the easiest one to replicate turns out to also be the least reflective or dialogical one (Ridley-Duff & Bull 2011).

A compounding issue is that the two RPAs mobilized with different routes in mind towards objectives that are similar, but not entirely the same. The purpose of RPA-1 was not wealth creation as such. Rather it was continued subsistence. The notion of social enterprises being wealth-creation engines in their own right that lay the conditions for business at the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ might make sense to outsiders looking inward, who see potential for value chain improvement and better benefits from the resin industry at large. But it is not seen that way from the RPA-1 village looking outward. Rather the reasoning is the conservation/protection of the wealth that they already have. Moreover in this instance, where the RPA-1 was proving relatively sustainable, the notion of social enterprise as a value chain improvement comes up against deeply guarded practices of patronage which were arguably underappreciated in the delivery of the CISP project. In a sense, so too underappreciated was the temporal nature of being in time for indigenous Kuy minorities. Past experiences, present distresses and an increasingly uncertain future all constrain the potential for commercial social enterprise development but render the seeking of security within specific relationships perfectly intelligible.

A final point I turn towards is to the undisputed credit of the CISP project design. Oleoresin was targeted as a traditional product of Kuy communities and the objective was to preserve their way of life. This was the clearer objective of the CISP coordinator; far more important it seemed the developing markets per se. From this point a better answer is given, I feel, to the research question that I asked, if the notion of ‘emerging and thriving’ is removed
altogether from the usual reading of ‘markets.’ For sure, resin collection is a source of income. But it is also part of the customary economy. RPA-1 members were clear about this. They were reliant on access to the forest not only for resin but also for a range of NTFPs which provide not just subsistence but also access to products (not always strictly legal ones) that can be traded for other goods. To this, a further material issue can be added. Access to forestry has traditionally sustained the Animist spiritual practices of Kuy minorities, providing both materials for rituals and sites where they take place. As Keating (2012; 2013) describes in depth, the exclusion of Kuy communities from forestry resources and therefore from their spiritual beliefs and practices has been fundamentally damaging to village solidarity. In RPA-1 this emerged more strongly in comments lamenting selfishness and lack of friendliness. It was elaborated more in the group discussion when I asked how social life had changed. There were fewer ceremonies, people were busier earning money firstly but overwhelmingly, their rights of access to sites of particular significance were forbidden. The RPA-1 leader expressed that keeping access to some spiritual sites open was tied up in the forest conservation objectives. It was therefore relevant to the RPA-1 although he was also clear that the main incentive was to safeguard resin collection. Perhaps too many objectives would be deemed confusing but still, RPA-1 might come closer to a reading of social enterprise when it is interconnectedly (with household survival) a means of preserving customary practices from one generation to the next.

In this sense, outside of normal ways of framing social enterprise, it could be taken into consideration that spiritualist practices are in themselves are also one part of an economy when ‘economies’ are broadly and diversely understood (Gibson-Graham et al. 2013). Spiritual practices which involve both ‘reciprocal exchanges’ and exchanges without such rigid equivalences can be counted as non-capitalist and non-monetary transactions with economic value nonetheless. What this shows is that perhaps the contribution that RPA-1, as a better organised and more recognisable social enterprise than RPA-2, survives and thrives by keeping a diverse economy (which is inclusive of a range of capitalist, alternative and non-capitalist economic practices of exchange and labour, thus both customary and modern) in motion. The contribution is restorative more than innovative, in that it maintains the plausibility of practices that are preconditional to village solidarity and wellbeing.

References


Gibson-Graham, JK, Cameron, J & Healy, S 2013, Take back the economy: an ethical guide for transforming our communities, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.


James, P, Nadarajah, Y, Haive, K & Stead, V 2012, Sustainable communities, sustainable development: Other paths for papua new guinea, University of Hawai'i Press, Honolulu.


**Notes**

1 This chapter is focused on social enterprise, as opposed to social entrepreneurship. The latter is a broad topic that encompasses a range of contexts, it is attributed for instance to the actions of policy makers and civic activists as far as it involves the mobilising of resources in different combinations in pursuit of a social effect. However related to social enterprise specifically, Ridley-Duff and Bull (2011) express that 'social enterprises (form) are the product of social entrepreneurship (process)' (78).

2 Participating agencies were: United Nations Development Programme; the United Nations Science and Cultural Organization; the International Labour Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization. Participating Government Ministries were the Ministries of: Culture and Fine Arts; Industry, Mines and Energy; Commerce; and Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MDG:F 2011).